



Assessing and Explaining Strategic Voting with Survey Data: A Finite Mixture Discrete Choice Model

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Voters' propensities to vote strategically is the main component of what Duverger calls the "psychological effect" of electoral systems. Electoral research has therefore given considerable attention to the amount of strategic voting and its consequences for electoral results. Despite the importance of the topic, research on strategic voting has not yet reached a consensus on how to measure it. A finite-mixture discrete-choice model for the reconstruction of voting calculi is presented that enables to explicitly specify the calculi of different voting types and to derive individuals' posterior probabilities to have used any of these. It is further shown how maximum marginal likelihood estimates of the model parameters can be computed via an expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm. The model is applied to the case of the 2010 UK general election.