Joint event of the Research Seminar on Foundations of Statistics and the MCMP Colloquium on 29 July 2011

> MCMP & Statistics Department

14:30 Coffee & Cake "MCMP & Statistics Department"

15:15 Teddy Seidenfeld (Carnegie Mellon University) Three contrasts between two senses of coherence

(Joint work with M. J. Schervish and J. B. Kadane – Statistics, CMU)

B. de Finetti defended two senses of *coherence* in providing foundations for his theory of subjective probabilities. *Coherence*₁ requires that when a decision maker announces *fair* prices for random variables these are immune to a uniform sure-loss – no *Book* is possible using finitely many *fair* contracts! *Coherence*₂ requires that when a decision maker's forecasts for a finite set of random variables are evaluated by Brier Score – squared error loss – there is no rival set of forecasts that dominate with a uniformly better score for sure.

De Finetti established these two concepts are equivalent: *fair* prices are *coherent*₁ if and only if they constitute a *coherent*₂ set of forecasts if and only if they are the expected values for the variables under some common (finitely additive) personal probability.

I report three additional contrasts between these two senses of *coherence*. One contrast (relating to finitely additive probabilities) favors *coherence*₂. One contrast (relating to decisions with moral hazard) favors *coherence*₁. The third contrast relates to the challenge of state-dependent utilities.

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